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Regional Cooperation in Employment and Training Policy: A Matter of
Collective Action or Intergovernmental Relations?

Abstract
This article provides empirical evidence that factors derived from the collective action theories
resonated with employment and training policy implementers as the most influential for
achieving regional cooperation for community development. Findings indicate that having
specific reasons and the opportunity to benefit from collaborating does more to advance
cooperation than competing for scarce resources. Permitting Workforce Investment Boards selfgoverning authority and providing an opportunity for mutual gains are promising means for
gaining substantive cooperation both within and across workforce investment areas in U.S.
employment and training policy.
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Regional Cooperation in Employment and Training Policy: A Matter of
Collective Action or Intergovernmental Relations?
Global competition is making regional economic cooperation a more meaningful policy for
community development. As markets integrate regionally and globalize internationally
cooperation in economic development is becoming increasingly important. One prominent
feature of globalization is the value of cooperation among an increasing number of players to
continue economic growth. In the United States there is great potential benefit for regional
cooperation in employment and training policy. Employment and training policy tries to
enhance individuals’ skills and connect people with marketable jobs in their communities. The
most recent employment and training policy, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, asks
a wide variety of organizations to cooperate to meet the labor demands within economic regions.
Additionally, WIA recommends that workforce investment board (WIB) areas that are contained
within the same economic region cooperate across their borders. 1
This study examines cooperation in U.S. regions that are integrated economically but not
politically in both intra- and interstate metropolitan areas. Factors that policy implementers see
as most important to cooperation are identified. Examining employment and training policy
from the perspective of economic regions is salient because economic and employment problems
typically ignore the local governments boundaries that make up intergovernmental relations in
communities (Barnes & Ledebur,1998; Wright, 1988). Implementing employment and training
policy regionally may mitigate some of the competitive factors communities in metropolitan
areas face when both business and labor are mobile.
Only a few studies have made use of empirical evidence to further our understanding
about cooperation in economic regions, especially those that are interstate. Zimmerman
specifically notes that interstate cooperation is an area that researchers have paid relatively little
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attention (2002). Those case studies that do measure or quantify their evidence for cooperation
treat it as voluntary rather than requested by a higher authority. Studies that do provide
empirical evidence for voluntary cooperation include Perkmann’s work on regional cooperation
across borders in Europe (2003), Olberding’s evidence on voluntary regional partnerships in
economic development (2002a; 2002b) and Lackey, Freshwater and Rupasingha’s examination
of cooperation in rural areas in Tennessee (2002). Yet, cooperation is not always voluntary. In
fact, U.S. policy mandates cooperation in public policy areas such as homeland security and
employment and training policy. Subsequently WIA, the most recent employment and training
policy, is a particularly good test case for understanding more about economic regional
cooperation across communities for three reasons: 1) U.S. employment and training policies have
historically been rife with a lack of cooperation and coordination; 2) WIA requires 17 programs
to cooperate which is a wider variety than any previous employment and training policy; and 3)
this federal policy encourages U.S. states to cooperate when they share a stake in the
performance of economic regions that extend across state borders or are contained within a
state. 2
Much of our understanding of the factors that affect cooperation in the U.S. has been
developed through case studies from intergovernmental relations (IGR)and public policy
implementation literature (Wright, 1998; Zimmerman, 2002; Oakerson, 1987; Kenyon, 1999;
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; and Pressman, 1975) as well as the collective action literature on
common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; Singleton, 1998). 3 Since cooperation is not always
voluntary, the collective action literature is particularly attractive theoretical lens to use for
understanding regional cooperation in employment and training policy. What is lacking is a
clear understanding of the way the IGR and collection action theories can foster cooperation in
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implementing public policy. The empirical research presented here probes the answers to some
basic questions that influence cooperation. What factors from either literature are most
important for gaining cooperation? Under which circumstances are the theories important (i.e.,
interstate or intra-state cooperation)? Is the collective action literature more relevant when the
needed cooperation is in regions that cross multiple jurisdictions? Are there best practices or
examples of implementation that demonstrate the empirical findings? Drawing from these
literatures and informed by 84 interviews with state and regional employment and training
experts survey questions were developed. The survey questions provide an empirical assessment
of the most important theories that can lead to cooperation by communities in intra- and
interstate regions with an empirical assessment of the most important factors. The interviews
also help identify best practices or examples that illustrate the way the empirical data on the
theories plays out in the community.

TWO LITERATURES ON FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATION
Intergovernmental Relations
The IGR literature is a useful starting point for understanding cooperation that crosses
jurisdictions. It suggests several factors that are important for cooperation. First, state and local
jurisdictions and boundaries create complex relationships because of the overlapping political,
fiscal, and administrative responsibilities of the governing entities (Wright, 1988, p. 333). This
can harm policy cooperation because each jurisdiction has the autonomy to make decisions
within its area of authority but they may not have to take into account the effect it has on
neighboring jurisdictions or the opportunity that working together might bring to the area.
Political Scientist Susan E. Clarke found jurisdictions and responsibilities in workforce
development in Denver could indeed hamper cooperation and change. She found that:
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"In Denver, workforce development often appeared to elicit
conflicts between functional and territorial interests- a focus
on workforce development processes colliding with a territorial
focus on poor neighborhoods…To the extent that federal and
foundation workforce development monies seemed to repeat
funding patterns to the same territorial interests, they signaled
a continuation of the "old ways of thinking" to some business
interests (Clarke 2002, 14).
Second, this literature indicates there are basic conditions for cooperation that influence
policy outcomes. These include the perceived sense of urgency about the problem, the
anticipation of low financial or legal costs for the primary participants, and provision of
information, technical and financial support (Wright, pp. 397-398). Each of these conditions is
relevant to both intra- and interstate cooperation in employment and training policy. The Wage
Record Interchange System, (WRIS), is evidence that information facilitates interstate
cooperation. WRIS is an interstate clearinghouse for unemployment insurance wage records.
The wage record information provided by WRIS helps workforce areas accurately calculate the
federally mandated performance outcome that use wage data. Specifically, WRIS provides
workforce investment areas data on clients that use services in one state but work in another.
The growth in the number of participating states, from seven in 2002 to 40 states in 2003, is
undeniable evidence of the value of cooperation and sharing information under WIA (U.S.
General Accounting Office 2002, 20; Workforce ATM 2003).
The literature also notes the potential impact that the political image of the participants as
well as the pursuit of different goals can have on cooperation. Wright contends “image” refers to
the perceptions that local officials have of other IGR participants that help them by reducing the
uncertainty involved in interacting (Wright, p. 243) or "the subjective level of confidence with
which each decision is made" (Downs, 1967, p. 76). 4 A potential example from WIA includes
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the willingness of organizations to share resources in a “one-stop” based on the reputation of the
other participants even if they had not worked together previously. 5
Finally, the IGR literature indicates that the pursuit of different goals impedes
cooperation. This occurs when two sets of actors are working on a matter but are unaware of or
unsympathetic to the other actor's goals (Pressman; Wright). The pursuit of different goals can
be illustrated by the fact that some actors involved in WIA are focused on the provision of social
services while others have a primary focus on economic development. This results in one
agency focusing on the provision of childcare or transportation to foster employability while
another agency focuses on training to meet employer needs. This results in different means,
objectives, and goals for the actors’ work. To this point, one state official noted that there is
"tension between those who look at [WIA] as written for the poorer people and those who see the
[WIA] as a broader system.” 6
There are also instances of personal animosity in the intergovernmental relationship and
this might be elicited by questioning the motives or intentions of others (Wright, 246). An
example from one interview that brings this theory home follows. When asked about what
factors keep stakeholders from cooperating to make workforce development effective the
interviewee noted, “We have not worked together before and in some places it is old
relationships that go back to whether or not there should be red light or a stop sign. I am not
kidding. They haven't worked together since. It's colloquial but it matters.”

Collective Action
The collective action literature examines general theories and hypotheses about cooperation
among individuals, associations, agencies, and governments and provides perhaps the best
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opportunity to understand cooperation in employment and training policy. It is particularly
helpful in two ways. First, collective action resolves problems that a single individual cannot
solve alone. The traditional explanation of collective action problems is that they occur when a
lack of cooperation prevents a mutually beneficial outcome (Singleton, 1998). Second, the
collective action literature describes circumstances that inhibit cooperation such as free-rider
problems and transaction costs. This literature also suggests several mechanisms for overcoming
collective action problems and improving cooperation such as social institutions and self
governing authority.
The free-rider problem occurs when people can benefit from the production of a good or
service without contributing to the cost of its production (Sandler, 1992). A potential example of
the free-rider problem in employment and training policy could occur if one business provides
job training and then another business later hires the trained employee without having
contributed to the training. The free-rider problem may translate to agencies or employers being
reluctant to participate in WIA because of concerns that the benefits of their efforts are serving
non-participating or non-paying businesses. Agencies or institutions may also be affected by
free-rider problems if, for the purpose of meeting performance measures, they cannot claim the
credit for the individuals they help.
Transaction costs are the resources devoted to measurement and enforcement of
agreements (North, 1990) as well as the resources expended for negotiating possible solutions
(Singleton, 1998). Under the Manpower and Development Training Act of 1965 the Labor
Department contracted out to at least 10,000 private businesses, non-profit and community based
organizations, and state and local agencies to provide employment and training services.
Ultimately, the employment training system became too complicated and fragmented for the
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institutional arrangements to operate efficiently making the transaction costs too high. Another
example of the effects of transaction costs is the concern employment and training providers
have about the cost of collecting information required under WIA. Interviews conducted for this
research with policy experts revealed that the burden of gathering and reporting this information
has been a factor in training providers' reluctance to participate in the program.
The role that social institutions play is one of the most helpful insights of the collective
action literature for explaining cooperation in employment and training policy.
Knight reveals that social institutions can be simple structures such as a neighborhood
organization or more complex institutions such as economic organizations and multi-national
corporations. These institutions foster cooperation by providing information that resolves
uncertainty and stabilizes expectations between participants. Additionally, institutions are helpful
for obtaining mutually beneficial outcomes because they provide maintenance and stability in the
distribution of outcomes so that the outcomes do not exclusively favor any one group (1992). By
performing this function, institutions become the arrangements that provide the opportunity to
reduce transaction costs and help overcome collective action problems. Social institutions
spread the rules and uphold the values that are accepted by the participants.
The authority for self-governing and organizing provides a necessary mechanism for
obtaining cooperative behavior with multiple levels of government as well as promotes the
efficient use of social institutions. Specifically, it permits members to create their own contracts
and thus lowering the transaction costs involved with establishing and monitoring new
institutions, reducing free-rider problems, and fostering communication. This leads to more
efficient and/or stable institutions that can harness more information and resources than
individuals or organizations could do otherwise. The institutions themselves provide incentives
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that foster cooperative behavior as well as a mechanism for overcoming collective action
problems. Employment and training policy might also benefit from self-governing and selforganizing authority that could foster local level cooperation in both the intra-state and interstate
regions in WIA. This authority might be guided or aided by regional and national bodies.
In light of the discussion presented collective action theories should provide better tools
for gaining cooperation under the circumstances as intergovernmental boundaries do not
coincide with economic regions. Given the increased likelihood of less voluntary and more
mandatory cooperative endeavors do to, in part, the pressures of globalization, climate change
and security issues the more collective action literature is likely to offer our communities. The
collective action literature stands to provide more in terms of tools for creating healthier and
more secure communities both financially and physically.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This analysis uses data compiled from a 2003 survey of all of the individual workforce
investment board members in 46 workforce investment areas in the U.S. The survey provides
primary data from five interstate regions and four intra-state regions to investigate the
aforementioned factors that affect cooperation in employment and training policy. The five
interstate regions are Chicago (IL-IN), Cincinnati (OH-KY-IN), Kansas City (MO-IL),
Louisville (KY-IN), and St. Louis (MO-IL), and the four intra-state regions are Cleveland (OH),
Indianapolis (IN), Peoria (IL), and Springfield (MO). The interstate areas are major metropolitan
areas with populations over one million. The intra-state regions are chosen to control for state
effects.

Survey Design and Administration
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The survey instrument, created in 2002, uses questions derived from the IGR and
collective action literatures as well as factors identified in interviews with policy experts. By
design the entire population of the local workforce investment boards was surveyed. Using the
entire population reduces bias and sampling error due either investigator discretion or
respondent characteristics. Since this study has a population that is just over 1,500 a response
rate of 600 yields a plus or minus reliability factor just between three and four percent.
To guard against measurement error, the survey was pre-tested for clarity of the questions
and the reliability of responses -- measuring the concepts they were intended to measure-- with
seventeen survey takers from the nine metropolitan regions. Some of the changes made from the
pre-test included adding questions that directly asked about cooperation and effectiveness.
Finally, in March of 2003 the survey was mailed to 1,538 workforce investment board members
in nine metropolitan areas using Dillman’s (2000) “Total Design Method”. The final population
of survey respondents was 1,521. 7 Six hundred and ten completed surveys were returned
providing a 40 percent response rate.
The survey recipients were all the members of the 46 workforce boards in the nine
metropolitan regions. The board members are charged with oversight and guidance of the
implementation of employment and training policy for their workforce investment areas. The
workforce boards are comprised of members representing the many sectors that are affected by
employment and training policy. At the local level the chief elected official such as a mayor or
county executive appoints the board members. A representative from the business sector chairs
the workforce investment board. Additionally, business representation is required to be 51
percent of the make-up of the board at both the state and local level. In theory, the business
representatives are chief executives because they have the authority to make decisions for their
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organization. In practice, many times the business representative is a senior human resource
person from the company she represents. The other sectors represented on the boards include;
organized labor, education (primarily but not exclusively post-secondary), economic
development, the program agencies involved with the one-stops, community based
organizations, government and public officials such as mayors and legislators. Other
representatives include constituents from sectors such as health care, child support and TANF, as
well as farmers and other people representing community or rural interests. The number of
members on the workforce boards in this study ranges in size from 11 to 68.
The diversity of the respondents approximates the membership of the board, as seen in
Table 1. A large majority of respondents (64%) indicate they were on the board for two years or
more. This fact suggests that most of the respondents have substantial experience supporting
their comments. The survey items (see Tables 2, 3, and 4) were drawn specifically from the two
literatures as well as interviews with policy experts. All questions were on a seven point scale
with the exception of four questions that were on a five point scale. Using the mean of the
responses on each of the measures provides an overall sense of importance or weight of each
factor to the responding practioners. By examining the t-test for each and whether the outcomes
are statistically significant provides more weight for the evidence. The factors are also
considered in terms of the percentage of responses as agree or strongly agree by board member
type and type of region (i.e., intra- or interstate). Additionally, ANOVA analysis was used to
identify differences in means by intra and interstate region type as well as differences between
groups of board members. 8 Finally a factor analysis is performed on the 10 potentially
motivating factors to cooperation from the IGR literature and the 11 potentially motivating
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factors derived from the Collective Action literature to further understand the theories relevance
to cooperation with WIBs under WIA.
[Insert Tables 1 about Here]

FINDINGS
Descriptive Data
Findings from this survey of workforce investments board members reveal the collective action
theory carries more explanatory weight than IGR theory in this situation. Nonetheless a few of
the assertions in IGR literature are important for cooperation for workforce investment board
members and t-tests reveals that all the differences are statistically significant and did not occur
by chance. Table 2 reveals that the “good reputations of the board members” is the most
important factor. The fact that gains in cooperation would reduce financial costs of reaching
goals is the second most important factor promoting cooperation. The next two highest scoring
factors are the importance of reputations for working with other boards is a sense of urgency
about the problem. Finally, having the roles and responsibilities of each party clearly defined
also appears to be a factor that merits attention for obtaining cooperation by workforce board
members. Additionally, at the WIB level, board members personalities are not as important to
cooperation as the literature and interviews suggest.
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
Factors identified in the collective action literature are more relevant to regional
cooperation than those found in the IGR literature in employment and training policy. The
findings in Table 3 reveal that board members are motivated to cooperate when more individuals
and employers are being helped and once again all of the differences are statistically significant.
The ability to provide more services was also important for gaining cooperation. Other factors
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that are important for obtaining cooperation are the opportunity to obtain more information,
funds via grants, as well as the potential for mutual gains to be realized. The ability to receive
credit for outcomes was somewhat less important than the other criteria. Neither the amount of
time it takes to reach goals nor the complexity of WIA are considered particularly onerous to
achieving cooperation from the descriptive statistics.
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
Peoria, Illinois provides an example of the way cooperation under WIA was ultized to
obtain resources and reduce the financial cost of increasing employment in their region for the
benefit of both employers and employees. One interviewee from Peoria recounted that, “Without
WIA we would not have the H-1B Grant. 9 We would have lost that opportunity. The H-1B
Grant put 2.5 million into training people on computers-- what we desperately needed. Without
WIA the money would have gone elsewhere and we would have had no way to fill our need.”
Both literatures identified that processes or the way boards organize themselves can
foster cooperation and all but three of the noted findings were statistically significant. Table 4
reveals that the board members score their own boards high on several factors drawn from
collective action theories. These factors include boards having the ability to organize their own
priorities and having a voice in determining the boards membership. However, workforce
boards often indicated that they did not have an institution that was fostering cooperation in their
region, an important factor identified in the collective action literature. The mean score for
institutions was not different from the theoretical null hypothesis for this factor. The lack of a
universally recognized institution to facilitate cooperation may be influencing a low score on
communicating frequently with other boards in their region which was also not different from
null hypothesis of no effect of communication. In general, board members are noted as bringing
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special interests to the table, a factor that the IGR literature indicates can hamper cooperation.
Yet, at the same time board members are found to be sympathetic to multiple goals which the
IGR literature suggests is important for fostering cooperation. Combined, the responses suggest
that board members understand the complexity of the issues they are facing when it comes to
bringing about cooperation, but may not have all the institutional arrangements in place to
achieve their objectives.
An example of the complexity plays out as one interviewee noted in Indianapolis
"Marion County is the dominant player and the other areas don’t feel they are getting enough
attention- resources.” He noted that “different priorities” keep stakeholders from cooperating
“and when you are talking about different priorities you are also talking about money that people
use for priorities and what is viewed as important for economic development and growth.” Most
of the regional level experts interviewed in Indianapolis saw the regional plan as merely a paper
document. However, one interviewee noted that, “Regional planning has helped people
recognize the size of stakeholders out of their immediate reality” and another interviewee noted
“It has given us a clearer understanding of the different priorities.”
Overwhelmingly board members indicate that cooperation between workforce boards is
important for improving the workforce development system. Board members did not indicate
that competition is important for improving the outcomes and the mean of 3.4 is not different
from the null hypothesis of no effect for this factor. Board members were slightly more likely to
indicate a top priority of WIA is the provision of social services than they were to indicate
economic development. Boards members also see themselves as cooperating and effective
within their own boards but they do not report cooperating with other boards to the same degree.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
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Analysis by Region Type
There are clearly key factors that influence cooperation. There may be differences by
type of region that could illuminate the circumstances where collective action as opposed
intergovernmental relations theory provided more help in achieving cooperation. The same
measures that are in Tables 2 through 4 were aggregated to the intra and interstate level to see if
there is a spatial difference by type of region. As seen in Table 5 three factors differ in their
outcomes by type of region. Personalities are slightly more important in interstate regions than
intra-state for gaining cooperation but in neither area are they seen as particularly important.
Having a voice is a more important factor in both types of regions but even more so in interstate
regions as compared to intra-state regions. The most important factor for both regions is the
board’s ability to organize their priorities. Once again, this is rated higher by boards in interstate
regions compared to boards intra-state regions. Although the differences range only from .3 to .5
between the regions, each factor is seen as more important to interstate regions where
presumably there are more impediments to gaining cooperation. Again, the collective action
theories more frequently yield relevant information about cooperation when compared to the
intergovernmental relations theories.
Two examples of they way having a voice and self-organizing priorities have aided
cooperative outcomes are the interstate cases of St. Louis and Cincinnati. St. Louis is an
interstate case where the governors of Illinois and Missouri mandated regional planning for
implementing the workforce investment in the region. In St. Louis, the East-West Gateway
Coordinating Council (the metropolitan planning organization and council of governments) and
the St. Louis Regional Chamber & Growth Association created the Workforce Development
Policy Group as a governing taskforce for implementing WIA regionally in response to the
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governors from both states declaring St. Louis a regional workforce area. The Workforce
Development Policy Group (WDPG) provides broad direction to the WIBs but has no legal
authority. The regional mandate and direction from the WDPG has resulted in the boards
standardizing policy manuals, data sharing, and their seeking of interstate agreements, for
example. However, the interstate case of Cincinnati demonstrates that having an self-organizing
board does not always ensure a high intensity of cooperation, but perhaps some cooperation. In
Cincinnati, 13 counties, ten one-stop operators, and the business chamber put together a regional
group called Cincinnati U.S.A. Regional One-Stop Consortium. It is unfunded and voluntary
and the participants take turns hosting meetings and taking minutes. The consortium began in
March 2001. At the local level it is well received but is primarily a vehicle for sharing basic
information across jurisdictions rather than an organization for ensuring regional policy
implementation.
[Insert Table 5 about Here]

What are the most Salient Factors?
Factor analysis is one method to test the validity of the concepts tapping into cooperation.
Factor analysis is a purely statistical technique that indicates the degree to which factors or items
relate to a similar concept (Kim & Mueller 1978, p. 56). In general there are two uses of factor
analysis: exploratory and confirmatory. Exploratory factor analysis permits the research to
explore if particular items are related to one another in an atheoretical fashion. For example, if
an investigator did not know which personality characteristics where association with a variety
of concepts such as being introverted or extroverted, then the investigator could analyze the data
using factor analysis and see which characteristics were more closely related to each other.
Factor analysis is a method to test the validity of the constructs where Cronbach's Alpha helps
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determine the reliability measures. Typically a Cronbach’s Alpha of .7 or higher demonstrates a
very reliable measure of the concept. The IGR and collective action literature provided
substantial information about the factors that underlie the concepts of cooperation but how these
concepts apply to cooperation under WIA is unknown. Subsequently, exploratory factor analysis
is useful to identify which concepts explicitly relate to cooperation with WIBs in WIA.
To determine which factors are most salient for fostering or hindering cooperation the
method of factor analysis was employed. Table 6 provides a factor analysis of 10 motivating
concepts from the IGR literature and the Cronbach’s Alpha for the items. Using Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) as the method of extraction it is possible to see which indicators
have the most weight when it comes to cooperation with WIBs in WIA. 10 The Cronbach’s
Alpha at .59 is acceptable. The eigenvalues for the first three principal components were 2.5, 1.5
and 1.3. Eigenvalues below one are typically discarded as minor factors (Kim and Mueller 1978,
p. 9). The varimax rotation provided three factors supporting the cited literature. Together the
three factors explain 52 percent of the variance in the original items. The loadings indicate the
correlation with the original 10 concepts and are used to label the three salient factors for
cooperation from the IGR literature.
The items loading strongly on the first factor, were several items but in light of the
combination and following component loadings the results suggest that “defined roles, reduced
costs and urgency” are the most beneficial as Wright indicated these to be some of the basic
conditions needed for cooperation in intergovernmental relations. The nearly equal loading for
the reputation factors in this component suggests that reputation works in concert with roles,
urgency and ability to reduce cost. However, the third component “Reputations” highlights the
uniquely important role of reputations in and of itself plays for cooperation as both Wright and
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Downs conclude the importance of image or reputation can have and reduce uncertainty which
cannot only reduce costs but also enable intergovernmental relations by providing confidence.
The second factor is labeled “Personalities and Interests”. Although personalities were not
deemed vital to cooperation from the descriptive survey data, they did appear more important in
interstate regions than intra-state in the analysis by type of region. Findings from interviews in
Cleveland, Ohio corroborate that personality or leadership can make a difference as interviews
revealed no cooperation between the city of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County however the
anticipated change of leadership with a new Mayor of Cleveland has sparked hope for
collaboration in the future among interviewees. The factor loadings suggest that in addition to
personalities special interests are also important. These findings coincide with Wright,
Pressman, Clarke’s contention that special interest or different goals are related to obtaining
cooperation.
[Insert Table 6 about Here]
PCA is employed again to determine which concepts from the collective action literature
affect cooperation with WIBs under WIA. Table 7 provides the factor analysis of 11 concepts
from the collective action literature and the Cronbach’s Alpha score for the items. The
Cronbach’s Alpha is .70 which is considered highly reliable. The eigenvalues generated from the
varimax rotation provided four principal factors derived from the collective action literature. The
eiginvalues for the four principal components are 3.91, 1.5, 1.12 and 1.0. Together the four
factors account for 68 percent of the variance in the original items which is more than 16 percent
higher than the IGR factor loadings. The loadings with the original 11 concepts are used to label
the four salient factors for cooperation from the collective action theories.
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The items that loaded strongly on the first factor “More Help” all revolve around more
people being served whether it be employers or employees. The ability to gain more services
and information also fosters cooperation. This supports Singleton’s supposition that mutual
beneficial outcomes promote cooperation. The second factor “Transaction Costs” play a clear
role with time to reach goals and complexity of WIA being rated as high and related to
cooperation. The third factor “Self-organizing” and allowing WIBs to have a voice in its
membership is also an agent for cooperation as Ostrom, Singleton and other collective action
theorist have contended. Finally, the fourth factor “Gains and Credit” indicate mutual gains and
the ability to receive credit are also seen as factors that contribute to cooperation under WIA.
[Insert Table 7 about Here]
Efforts in Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri demonstrate they way access
to more services, reducing transaction cost, the opportunity to self-organize and the ability to
receive credit for outcomes can motivate cooperation. The WIBs in these two communities
demonstrate a good working relationship and the ability to establish enabling mechanisms
through local agreements to meet employers’ needs with the minimum hassle in terms of paper
work for the employer. Potential employees may be from either or both Kansas and Missouri
training programs that are meeting employer needs because administrators work out the
paperwork among themselves so each can obtain due credit and demonstrate accountability for
funds.

CONCLUSION
The data and findings indicate the collective action literature provides more insights into ways to
create effective cooperation across communities in employment and training policy. This
suggests that regional cooperation in community development is more about collective action
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than intergovernmental relations. Perhaps this is due, in part, to the fact that there are multiple
actors that are not directly tied to traditional government sectors. Subsequently, the problems of
cooperation are not really confined to intergovernmental actors and actions. Cooperation is
motivated by the way communities perceive the potential benefit or gains that will come from
boards working together or the potential loss by not doing so.
Information on the way boards operate in employment and training policy reveals that
WIA provides an opportunity for boards to exercise a voice and determine their priorities for
their communities. Additionally, in each category where the factors are statistically significantly
different by region type, the interstate board regions rated these factors as more important than
did the intra-state respondents. Board members rate institutions as low in terms of fostering
cooperation and at the same time note less cooperation across boards than within boards in
communities. The data also reveal that boards clearly see cooperation as important and
competition as less important to the success of WIA in their communities.
Isolating specific factors that affect regional cooperation in employment and training
policy is helpful for gaining information about cooperation in community development policy.
Obtaining mutually beneficial outcomes motivates cooperation in employment and training
policy. This suggests that incentives for grants that foster collaboration among boards as well as
access to technology or resources could be helpful in achieving cooperative outcomes across
communities. The findings also indicate that when cooperation is mandatory, giving boards
reasons and rewards for cooperating is the most instructive way to create meaningful cooperation
across communities in economic regions. Using punitive measures or placing boards in
competition with one another is not nearly as helpful for gaining cooperation. The data also
reveal that permitting self-governing authority is conducive to obtaining cooperation. The lower
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rating of cooperation across WIBs as compared to within WIBS is noteworthy. It draws into
consideration the potential value of greater institutional participation or oversight could provide
for fostering cooperation across communities.
Finally, the factor analysis highlights the ways both literatures can provide useful guiding
concepts but even this statistical procedures highlights the a more significant contribution from
the collective action literature in terms of percent of variance explained in cooperation as well as
the greater number of components generated. Addressing an urgent problem, reducing costs and
clearly defined roles are some basic considerations cited in the IGR literature. Personalities and
special interests as well reputations of the individuals can play a role in the outcomes as
previously noted. The collective action literature illuminates more specifically the way the
possibilities to serve more clients and obtain more services and information specifically can
foster cooperation. Transaction costs and the ability to self-organize and determine ones own
group membership are also key factors. Finally, mutual beneficial outcomes as well the
opportunity to claim credit for outcomes are other specific tools that can promote cooperation
that are drawn from the collective action literature.
Regional cooperation across jurisdictions is anticipated to be more frequently mandated
for the protections of communities in terms of their economic, environmental, and personal
security. These findings suggest future research on regional cooperation may find theories
derived from the collective action literature to be particularly beneficial to community
development. Additional research on the most important factors for obtaining regional
cooperation in policy implementation will surely help to improve our economic, environmental,
and personal security now and into the future.
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Table 1. Sector Representative on the Board
Affiliation
Business
Labor Organization
Education Program
Economic Development Agency
One-Stop Program Partner
Community Based Organization
Public Official1
Other2

% of
Respondents
45
7
13
5
15
9
3
3

Notes:
1. “Public Official” includes locally elected officials and
representatives of local government.
2. “Other” includes representatives from the sectors of health
care, public policy research, agriculture or farmer,
community or rural issues, youth services, child support,
TANF or public assistance.
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003

Table 2. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics for Variables from the IGR Literature

Survey Question

Concept

1. Board members’ personalities complicate
cooperation
Personalities
2. The good reputations of board members play
a role in getting cooperation on the board.
Reputations
3. The good reputations of board members play
a role in getting cooperation with other
workforce areas.
Reputations II
4. Jurisdictional barriers such as boundaries for
school districts, workforce investment areas
and partner program regions are obstacles to
cooperation.
Jurisdictions
5. There is a sense of urgency about the
problem.
Urgency
6. The initial financial costs of coordinating
Low Initial
activities are low.
Costs
7. Coordinating will reduce financial costs.
Reduce Costs
8. Roles and responsibilities of each party are
clearly defined.
Defined roles

Min1

Max M

SD

n

0

7

3.8*

1.8 605

0

7

5.5*

1.6 605

0

7

4.8*

2.1 606

0

7

3.9*

2.0 605

0

7

4.8*

1.7 600

0
0

7
7

3.9*
4.9*

2.0 594
1.9 600

0

7

4.7*

2.0 604

* p < .05 Notes:1. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M= mean; SD = standard deviation; all questions on scale
0-7
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003
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Table 3. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics for Variables from the Collective Action
Literature

Survey Question

9. Cooperation makes it difficult to receive
appropriate credit for outcomes. (negatively
worded -reversed coding)
10. It takes too much time to reach goals
under the WIA.
11. The WIA is too complicated to consider
cooperation with other workforce areas.
12. More services can be provided because
of coordination.
13. More employers will be served because
of coordination.
14. More individuals will be served because
of coordination.
15. There is an opportunity to obtain more
information.
16. There is an opportunity to obtain more
grants.
17. The local workforce areas that work
together are better off for having
coordinated their activities.

Concept

Min1 Max M

SD

n

Credit

0

7

4.8*

2.0

607

Time

0

7

4.3*

1.9

607

Complexity

0

7

3.2*

1.8

605

More Services
More
Employers
More
Individuals
More
Information

0

7

5.4*

1.7

600

0

7

5.5*

1.8

604

0

7

5.6*

1.7

603

0

7

5.4*

1.7

601

More Money

0

7

4.9*

2.3

600

Mutual Gains

0

7

5.2*

2.1

603

* p < .05 Notes: 1. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M = Mean; SD = standard deviation; all questions on scale
0-7
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003
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Table 4. t-test Results and Descriptive Statistics of Measures of the way Workforce
Investment Board Work
Survey Question (concept source1)
Concept
Min2 Max M
SD
18. Our local board has a voice in
determining its membership. (CA)
19. Our local board has the ability to
organize its priorities as it deems
appropriate. (CA)
20. Board members bring special interests to
the table. (IGR)
21. Board members are sympathetic to
multiple goals for our workforce investment
area. (IGR)
22. The state or other organization fosters
cooperation among the local workforce
areas in our metropolitan region. (CA)
23. There is frequent communication
between our local workforce area and other
areas in our metropolitan region. (CA)
24. How important is cooperation between
local workforce investment areas for
improving the workforce development
system under WIA? (Interviews)
25. How important is competition between
local workforce investment areas for
improving the workforce development
system under WIA? (Interviews)
26. Economic development is a top priority
in the workforce development system under
WIA. (Interviews)
27. The provision of social services is a top
priority in the workforce development
system under WIA. (Interview)
28. Competition for resources between local
workforce areas increases the coordination
of services. (Interviews)
29. Competition between the local
workforce areas reduces coordination of
services. (Interviews)
30. There is a high degree of cooperation in
our workforce investment area. (Interviews)
31. There is a high degree of cooperation
with our workforce investment area and
other areas. (Interviews)
32. Our workforce board is effective in
achieving its goals. (Interviews)

n

Voice

0

7

4.9*

1.9 608

Organize
Priorities

0

7

5.3*

1.6 607

Special Interests

0

7

5.1*

1.7 608

Sympathetic to
Multiple Goals

0

7

5.3*

1.4 604

Institution

0

7

3.4

2.3 604

Communication

0

7

3.6

2.4 603

Cooperation3

0

5

4.5*

1.0 602

Competition3
Economic
Development
Top Priority3

0

5

2.8*

1.6 597

0

5

3.8*

1.3 599

Social Services
Top Priority3

0

5

3.6*

1.3 596

Competition
Good

0

7

2.8*

2.2 598

Competition Bad

0

7

3.4

2.4 603

Intra-WIA

0

7

5.1*

1.6 606

Cross WIA

0

7

4.1*

2.0 605

Effectiveness

0

7

5.0*

1.6 606

* p < .05
Notes: 1. IGR stands for intergovernmental relations and CA stands for collective action
2. Min = minimum; Max = maximum; M = Mean; SD = standard deviation;
3. Questions on scale 0-5 all others 0-7
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment Board Member Survey, 2003.
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Table 5. Factors that Differ by Type of Region
Variable
Intra-state Interstate
M 3.6
3.9
Personalities1
SD 1.8
1.8
M 4.6
5.0
2
Voice
SD 2.1
1.9
Organizing
M 5.1
5.4
Priorities3
SD 1.3
1.5
Within WIA
M 3.8
4.2
Cooperation4
SD 2.0
2.0
Notes: All questions on scale 0-7
1. F (1, 604) = 2.95, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .69 11
2. F (1, 607) = 4.19, p < .05, Bartlett’s χ2 = .12
3. F (1, 605) = 2.93, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .41
4. F (1, 603) = 3.60, p < .10, Bartlett’s χ2 = .75
Source: Author’s calculations from Workforce Investment
Board Member Survey, 2003

Table 6. Factor Analysis of 10 IGR Concepts on Cooperation
Concept
Factors
Financial
Personalities
Reputations
Costs, Roles
and Interests
and Urgency
Personalities
.00
.63
-.01
Reputations
.40
-.10
.49
Reputations II
.40
.01
.42
Jurisdictions
.15
.43
.05
Urgency
.37
-.17
-.31
Low Initial Costs
.33
.12
-.39
Reduce Costs
.38
.01
-.31
Defined roles
.39
.03
-.33
Special Interests
.13
.53
.21
Sympathetic to
Multiple Goals
.32
.28
.29
Cronbach’s α
.59
Eigenvalues
2.5
1.5
1.3
Percent of Total
Variance
25.00
14.59
12.75
Total Explained
Variance =
52.34
Note: Entries are factor coefficients from a principal component analysis with orthogonal
rotation. n =565
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Table 7. Factor Analysis of 11 Collective Action Concepts on Cooperation
Concept
Factors
More
Transaction
Self
Gains and
Helped
Costs
Organizing
Credit
Credit
.15
-.29
-.22
Time
-.10
.51
.39
Complexity
-.17
.47
.35
More Services
.43
.13
.00
More Employers
.44
.16
.01
More Individuals
.45
.13
-.01
More Information
.40
.17
-.03
More Money
.31
.19
-.01
Mutual Gains
.21
-.05
-.20
Voice
.15
-.38
.62
Organize Priorities
.19
-.40
.51
Cronbach’s α
.77
Eigenvalues
3.91
1.5
1.12
Percent of Total
Variance
35.51
13.60
10.19
Total Explained
Variance =
68.42

.48
.30
.18
-.22
-.26
-.21
.1
.33
.60
-.01
.12
1.00
9.13

Note: Entries are factor coefficients from a principal component analysis with orthogonal rotation.
n = 581
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ENDNOTES
1

Workforce Investment Board area is a designated area for implementing WIA policy.
The seventeen mandated programs are: Adult Worker, Dislocated Worker, Youth, Wagner-Peyser
Employment Service, Trade Adjustment Assistance Training, Employment and Training Services to Veterans,
Unemployment Insurance, Job Corps, Welfare-to-Work, Senior Community Service Employment, Migrant &
Seasonal Farmworker Employment and Training, Native American Employment and Training, Vocational
Rehabilitation Services, Adult Education and Literacy, Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education, DHHS Community
Services Block Grant, and HUD-administered employment and training. Two optional programs are: Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamps Employment and Training program.
3
Common pool resources are natural or man-made resource systems that are typically large and therefore
costly to exclude people from using. Typical examples of common pool resources include fishing grounds, grazing
areas, bridges, mainframe computers, and bodies of water (Ostrom,1999, p. 30).
4
Italics in original
5
“One-stops” are physical locations that operate as career centers. They provide information about and
access to job training, education, and employment services for employers and employees alike at a single
neighborhood office.
6
Interviewees were assured confidentiality and therefore are not referenced individually.
7
Board member surveys were dropped from the total population if informed they were no longer on the
board, passed away, or changed jobs.
8
In instances where there were unequal variances on the factors between intra- and interstate regions, ttests for unequal variances were conducted to determine if there is statistically significant differences between the
means.
9
The H-1B grant is a technical skills training grant to address domestic labor shortages in high skill and
high technology occupations. Its focus is on raising the technical skill levels of American workers so they can take
advantage of the new technology-related employment opportunities. Fees paid by employers who bring foreign
workers into the United States to work in high skill or specialty occupations on a temporary basis under H-1B
nonimmigrant visas finance these grants (U.S. Department of Labor, 2003).
10
A preliminary analysis using the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy indicate the
data are suitable for PCA. The sampling adequacy exceeds the critical value of .5 where the KMO equals .70 for the
IGR concepts and .83 for the collective action concepts.
11
Bartlett’s χ2 is a formal test of the equal variances assumptions. If Bartlett’s χ2 is statistically significant
we cannot assume equal variance and cannot trust the ANOVA results. In instances where equal variance was
drawn into question, two-sample t-tests for unequal variances were run.
2
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